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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

U.S. ARMY RESERVES ROLES: CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

BY

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by

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U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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State and local governments rely on the federal government to develop national priorities, determine gaps in national preparedness, and provide technical assistance and specialized resources for state and local planning that addresses national priorities. Demand for trained state and local first responders is increasing proportionally as the terrorist threat increases. Following the September 11 attacks, state and local governments will devote massive resources to protect their citizens, respond to threats and hoaxes, and bolster preparedness. This study will examine ways that the U.S. Army Reserve can leverage its force structure and core competencies with local, state, and federal governments to support consequence management operations and enhance Homeland Security.

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U.S. ARMY RESERVE ROLES: CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Such recent events as the attack on World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings and the Tokyo subway sarin attack confirm that terrorists possess the resources and will to use Weapons of Mass Effects (WME) against civilian populations and government targets alike. Asymmetric attacks involving the use of weapons of mass effects may be employed against civilian population centers in order to disrupt our infrastructure and economic base- or simply to create public fear or loss of confidence in our civilian political leadership.

Recognizing these threats, the U.S. Congress has set forth fundamental policies; provided a concept of the operations, response, and recovery actions; and assigned responsibilities to federal agencies. It also mandated federal partners to provide domestic disaster assistance, to include the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD maintains significant resources (personnel, equipment, and supplies) that may be available to support state and local civil response to a major disaster or emergency. Congress has also expressly mandated that DOD use a coordinated joint effort in responding to domestic emergencies. Such joint coordinated effort will include the Reserve Component resources as a full partner to enhance our national ability to respond to the consequences of a WME incident.

State and local government will rely on the federal government to develop national priorities, identify gaps in national preparedness, and provide technical assistance and specialized resources for state and local planning that meets national priorities. The demand for state and local first-responder training will increase over time as the terrorist threat increases. As the U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) has shifted from a forward-deployed force to a force projection force based largely in the continental U.S., the probability has also increased that terrorists will target U.S. forces in America in order to damage or destroy our force projection platforms.

Responding to the 11 September 2001 attacks, state and local governments will devote massive resources to protect their citizens, respond to threats and hoaxes, and bolster preparedness. This study describes how the local, state and federal domestic preparedness partnership can leverage Army Reserve force structure and core competencies in training, exercises, and incident response in support of this national effort.

NATIONAL POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies the security of our nation and the safety of our citizens both at home and abroad as a vital U.S. interest. The NSS for Global Age

stipulates that defending this vital interest "may involve the use of military force." If an emergency occurs, Federal departments, agencies, and the military "must be prepared to respond effectively at home and abroad to protect lives and property, mobilize personnel, resources, and capabilities necessary to effectively handle the emergency, and ensure the survival of our institutions and infrastructures." Such a response requires a national effort that relies on interagency coordination at the federal level.

President Bush established the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council in 10 October 2001 to develop and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to strengthen protections against terrorist threats or attacks in the United States. The team will synchronize and coordinate federal, state, and local counter terrorism efforts. The Council consists of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and such other officers of the executive branch as the President may from time to time designate.

The National Military Strategy (NMS) focuses mostly on asymmetric challenges to homeland security. The NMS calls for an increase in military capabilities to counter terrorism and to adapt military doctrine, training, and equipment to ensure a rapid and effective joint and interagency response.

The U.S. Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) identified Homeland Security as a vital interest. The ASPG envisions a range of asymmetric threats to the U.S. homeland. The ASPG designated a set of mission areas, that explicitly include Homeland security.

President Clinton's Executive Order 12938 (November 1994) warns against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. This document designates WMD as an unusual and extraordinary threat to the U.S., foreign policy and the economy of the U.S. It sets a high national priority on addressing the threat.

DOD DIRECTIVES

DODD 3025.15 establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibility for providing military assistance to civil authorities. The policy indicates the employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism is contingent upon Presidential declaration as well as approval by the Secretary of Defense. The Directive anticipates the use of National

Guard assets in support of local or state civil agencies as approved by the governor. DODD 33025.1 then provides the "approval criteria" for military requests to civil assistance.

STAFFORD ACT

The Federal Response Plan is authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 (as amended). The Stafford Act and the Executive Orders 12148 and 12656, provide primary responsibility for FEMA to coordinate Federal emergency preparedness, planning, management, and disaster assistance functions. FEMA is also responsible for establishing Federal assistance policy and developing and maintaining the Federal response Plan (FRP). Under the Stafford Disaster Relief Act, the FRP concepts apply to major disaster or emergency which includes natural catastrophe; fire, flood, or explosion regardless of cause; or any other occasion or instance for which the President determines that Federal assistance is needed to assist the state and local governments efforts and capabilities.³

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVES

Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62 provide subsequent policy guidance for combating terrorism and WMD. In June 1995, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39, sets forth the U.S. Policy on Counter-terrorism. PDD-39 directs federal departments and agencies to take various measures to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorism, deter and respond to terrorism, and develop effective capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of weapons of mass effects. The DOD role in "homeland defense" is "civil support" in nature. This reflects the fundamental principle that DOD does not take the lead, but provides support to the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) in the event of domestic contingency. PDD-39 modified the 1992 FRP, which authorizes federal support of civil authorities in the event of domestic disasters. Under PDD-39, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the designated lead federal agency for crisis management. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is assigned as the lead federal agency for consequence management. The FRP terrorism incident annex (FRP Annex TI) provides additional details regarding federal response to terrorism involving WME incidents.

In May 1998, the PDD-62 provided a systematic approach to fighting terrorism into the next century. It reinforces many of the U.S. agencys' roles in defeating terrorism. It also clarifies their activities in the wide range of U.S. counter terrorism programs. It codifies counter-terrorism programs; authorize apprehension and prosecution of terrorists; increases transportation security; enhances response capabilities; and protecting the computer-based system that lies at the heart of America's economy. PDD-62 establishes the Office of the

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator oversees a variety of relevant policies and programs pertaining to counter terrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness and consequence management for WME. According to PDD-62, the U.S. Army acts as the Executive Agent for the DOD Domestic Preparedness Program in supporting domestic authorities for and execution of crisis response and consequence management with regard to attacks utilizing WME.

In February 2001, the National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1) reiterates the role of the National Security Council (NSC) system as the process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national security policies. NSPD-1 designates the NSC Principals Committee as the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security and tasks the NSC Policy Coordinator Committees (PCC) with the management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple U.S. agencies. NSPD-1 also establishes the Policy Coordinator Committees and defines their roles and responsibilities. It also establishes the Office of Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. NSPD-1 abolishes the Counter-terrorism Security Group, Critical Infrastructure Coordination group, Weapons of Mass Destruction preparedness, Consequences Management and Protection group, and the interagency working group on Enduring Constitutional Governments. These were reconstituted as various forms of the NSC/PCC on Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness.

UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The Unified Command Plan 1999 (UCP-99) directs DOD organizational changes to include reorganization for a domestic WMD situation. UCP 99 directs the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Joint Forces Command (USCINCJFCOM) to establish the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), which is a fulltime command and control headquarters responsible to respond to a WME situation in the United States, its territories and possessions. Consistent with the principle of ensuring civil authority, the ATSD (CS) provides civilian oversight for Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). JTF-CS assigns consequence management support to civilian authority, while the Director of Military Support (DOMS) provides similar support in other emergencies, especially natural disasters. In addition, JTF-CS establishes doctrine and plans to coordinate and prepare DOD active and Reserve Component forces to respond to domestic WME incidents.

NUNN-LUGAR-DOMENICI ACT

Public Law 104-201, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, Title XIV was passed by Congress in September 1996. It was called the Defense Against WMD, also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) legislation. The NLD legislation required DOD to enact a training program for civilian personnel of federal, state, and local agencies regarding emergency response to a use or threatened use of WMD related material. It specified that the Reserve Components (RC) would carry out the program. In addition, it requires developing and maintaining a domestic rapid response team composed of members of the armed forces and DOD employees who are capable of aiding federal, state, and local officials in detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of WME containing chemical, biological, or related material.

In accord with the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, DOD was assigned the lead role in a federal interagency mission to develop an Emergency Response Assistance Program. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) as the DOD Executive Agent for program implementation. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment [ASA (I&E)] exercises program oversight. The Director of Military Support (DOMS) serves as the staff action agency

The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) Act stipulated training of first responders to deal directly with WMD terrorist incidents. DOD conducted a DPTP in FY 97 to provide training to state and local 'first responders.' Under the NLD, an interagency Senior Interagency Coordinating Group (SICG), chaired by the FEMA, provides overall program direction, thereby ensuring coordinated federal agency support to state and local response authorities. DOD is represented on the SICG by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC) and the Director of Military support (DOMS). Other SICG participants include the FBI, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the Department of energy (DOE).

The NLD identified 120 cities to receive training to conduct exercises, and to gain funding for training equipment. During the period of FY 98 through FY 00, over 28,000 state and local 'first responders' received training from DOD. Since the beginning of the DPTP, DOD has trained an average of over 9,000 first responders annually.

LEGISLATIVE ISSUES

There are certain statutory limitations on the use of Army Reserve soldiers in support of domestic disaster relief and emergency assistance. The Stafford Disaster Relief and

Emergency Assistance Act and Title 10 U.S. Code impose restrictions on the use of Army Reserve soldiers in Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) operations. These acts require that all state assets (including both civil authorities and the state National Guard) must be exhausted before the Army Reserve can legally be tasked and Army Reserve soldiers called to duty for domestic assistance operations. Furthermore, the President must have declared the incident a federal disaster and FEMA must have issued a request to the DOD for use of military assets. The only exception to these restrictions is the case of "Immediate Response", as outlined in DOD Directive 3025.15, Military Support to Civilian Authority. Immediate response situations are those that call for immediate use of military assets to save lives, prevent human suffering, and prevent great property loss. Immediate response authority is delegated to local commanders, but they are held to strict notification and verification procedures to their higher commanders. Civil authorities are required to reimburse DOD for the complete costs of such assistance requirements and commanders must terminate assistance as soon as the situation fails to meet the definition of immediate response.

FAST TRACK LEGISLATION

In January 1998, the DOD Tiger Team recommended certain amendments to the Stafford Act and the U.S. Code in order to facilitate the use of the Reserve Component in WME response. Such amendments would authorize the use of Reserve Components (as defined in Section 10101 of Title 10) and the National Guard (as defined in section (101)(3) of Title 32) to take such actions that may be necessary to provide an immediate response to a disaster involving a weapon of mass effect. The amendments would also require that DOD be reimbursed for any expenses incurred by the department for disaster preparedness programs conducted by the National Guard or the Reserve Components from funds appropriated for the purpose of the Act. Further, the amendments authorize the Secretary of Defense, at the request of the Director of FEMA, to direct the National Guard and Reserve Components to conduct training exercises, preposition equipment and other items, and to take such other actions that may be necessary to provide an immediate response to a WME incident. 9

WME incidents will require much more rapid federal response than a typical natural disaster. First, the amendment to 10 USC 12301(b) deserves favorable consideration. It would extend the authority of the Secretary of a military department to order Army Reserve units and soldiers to active duty for a period of not more than 30 days. ¹⁰ Current law imposes a 15-day limit. Second, an amendment to 10 USC 12304(b) would complement proposed amendments to the Stafford Act to allow RC to called to active duty in to provide assistance to either Federal

Government or a State in time of serious natural or manmade disaster, accident, and. to an emergency involving a weapons of mass effects.¹¹

ROLE OF ARMY RESERVE IN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

Other current
characteristics of the Army
Reserve facilitate Army Reserve
capabilities to support civil
authorities in consequence
management operations. Army
Reserve units are communitybased, comprised of citizen
soldiers who know and are often
active in their communities. They
have a personal stake in their
communities and are likely to
be accorded a certain level of

trust by local civil authorities.



Type unit	%	Type unit	%
Training & Exercise divisions	100	Hospitals	77
Railway units	100	Terminal battalions	50
I & R brigades	100	Medical groups	73
Judge Advocate General units	100	Theater signal commands	66
Civil Affairs units	97	Transportation commands	50
Psychological Operations units	81	Transportation groups	80
Chemical brigades	100	Water supply battalions	100
Chemical battalions	75	Petroleum supply battalions	92
Petroleum groups	50	Motor battalions	78
Medical brigades	85		

Engaged worldwide with ready units and soldiers.

FIGURE 1. PERCENT OF THE ARMY'S ASSETS BY CORE COMPETENCIES IN ARMY RESERVE.

The existing Army Reserve force structure is well-suited to respond to local and state requests for federal assistance for WME consequence management. The Army Reserve currently possesses 85% of total Army medical assets and 75% of the Army's chemical units (Fig.1). Given these resources, it is highly probable that the Army Reserve will be called upon to render consequence management support for any future WME incidents. The Army Reserve also possesses a preponderance of other Army assets that may be called upon for response to a WME incident, including transportation, civil affairs, quartermaster, and signal units.

ARMY RESERVE ROLES CONSTRAINTS

For the Army Reserve, incident response is an on order mission. Most units do not train to conduct specialized missions of military support to civil authorities (MSCA). Units do not have mission essential task lists (METL) which are based on these missions. However, basic wartime skills for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) are transferable to MSCA missions, especially enhance by some additional specialized training.

DOD CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING

The military role in providing support to civil authority is outlined in DODD 3025.1. DOD anticipate a wide variety of roles to support relief operations. The DOD's Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) will continue to support Domestic Preparedness Training Program (DPTP) along with the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP), Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) National Fire Academy, and Health and Human Services (HHS) Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS).

In addition to DOJ and DOD, FEMA and HHS provide DPTP to state and local first responders. At its National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute, FEMA provides WME-related courses to local and state organizations to train first responders. HHS developed the Metropolitan Medical Response Systems to enhance local planning and health care capacity to respond to the health consequences of a WMD release. The HHS program, begun in 1996, now includes 97 metropolitan areas with a total population of approximately 150 million people.

DOD conducted DPTP in FY 97 to enhance the nation's ability to mitigate the effects of terrorist uses of WME. Local officials credited the DOD's DPTP in bringing local, state, and federal emergency response agencies together into a closer working relationship. As of October 2000, DOD had completed training in 105 cities, which included four days of classroom activity plus a chemical tabletop exercise. In addition, 68 out of 105 cities received additional training in delivery of equipment, along with chemical field exercise and a biological tabletop exercise.

INTEGRATION OF RESERVE COMPONENT

In October 1997, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) tasked ASD SOLIC, ASD (Reserve Affairs), and ASA (OLIE) to provide a plan for integrating the Reserve Component (RC), including both the National Guard and Reserves, in support of WMD Domestic Preparedness programs. A core group of experts was formed in November 1997 to develop a detailed RC integration model known as "Tiger Team" for support of the WMD Domestic Preparedness program. The WMD Tiger Team was organized under the direction of the DOMS, WMD DP Program Integration Office (PIO). Organizations represented in the Tiger team core group include: the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC), the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD RA), the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army, the Office of Air Force

National Security Emergency Preparedness, the Directorate of Military Support, the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC). 13

ARMY RESERVE WMD DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS BRANCH

The Army Reserve began establishing their WMD domestic preparedness program by developing the DOMS Tiger Team RC integration plan in November 1997.¹⁴ The Office of the Chief of Army Reserve (OCAR) established a WMD Domestic Preparedness Branch, organized under the Office of Strategic Analysis and Liaison (OSAL) at the headquarters of the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) in Atlanta, Georgia.¹⁵

The Army Reserve WMD Domestic Preparedness Branch played a critical role in the development of the DOMS Tiger Team program integration plan. The WMD branch served as the executive agent for the Army Reserve, ensuring that Army Reserve assets were assessed and properly considered for integration into the WMD DP mission. For the first few months of operation, this branch initially operated with only a small cell of highly skilled individuals hand-picked from Army Reserve TPU units. The DOMS Tiger Team strategic plan integration of RC into the domestic preparedness program was then published in January 1998.

DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS TRAINING PROGRAM

Beginning in fiscal year 2001, the DPTP training responsibility for most of the NLD Act was transferred from DOD to DOJ, which has provided first responder training to over 1500 students. Inadequate numbers of first responders had been trained when the training responsibility was transferred to DOJ. In FY 01, DOJ had more than 5,000 students on state and local waiting lists for DPTP. Consequently, DOD will continue to conduct DPTP for FY 01 for certain courses, but not the full program. DOD maintained the following DPP training program in FY 01: Expert Assistance Program, Equipment Testing program, Chemical and Biological Improved Response Program, and Chemical-Biological Rapid response Team.

The DOJ's Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP), the nation's premier emergency responder, is located at Fort McClellan, Alabama. The CDP train trainers for police officers, fire fighters, emergency medical technicians, etc. The CDP goal is to train 10,000 personnel per year. However, if it achieves that goal, it will not make a dent in the demand for first responder training. There are nearly nine million emergency responders, over three million of whom are police, fire, 911 operators, EMT, and public utility personnel. Also four million care providers require training.

The DOJ's CDP training is not alone in conducting training: National Fire Academy is also a leading trainer in this field. DOD's Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) provided training to the nation's 120 cities, but this training responsibility was transferred to DOJ. In addition to DOJ, HHS and FEMA also conduct DPTP.

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has noted that DOD, DOJ and interagency program are not training sufficient people fast enough. In spite of DOJ's assumption in training responsibility, there is no comprehensive plan to establish a second CDP to conduct first responder training. Few have had genuine toxic agent training.

The Army Reserve is particularly well suited to provide support to the federal Domestic Preparedness Training Program sponsored by CBDCOM.¹⁹ Such capability is found in the current Army Reserve force structure, missions and operational experience. During Fiscal Year 1998 (FY98), the Army Reserve has been the recruiting, training and certifying (by CBDCOM) agency for a core instructor pool.¹⁶ Additionally, the WME Total Army Schools System (TASS) battalion structure and missions have been approved.²⁰ However, funding is required to create the organization.

The Army Reserve consequence management training involves partnership with other federal agencies as well as with state and local civil authorities. The Army Reserve has a training capability to conduct individual training within its seven Divisions (Institutional Training) or Div (IT)s: 80th Div (IT), 84th Div (IT), 95th Div (IT), 98th Div (IT), 100th Div (IT), 104th Div (IT), and 108th Div (IT). These seven divisions each operate within defined geographic areas of responsibility and possess a health services brigade and chemical battalion which provides military occupational specialty qualification (MOSQ) training for medical and chemical personnel. All of these units include certified instructors as part of the Div (IT) participation as accredited institutions in the Total Army Schools System (TASS).²²

By 1 December 1997 during the initial establishment of USARC WMD Branch, the USARC WMD Branch had recruited, trained, certified and fielded 13 instructors for the Domestic Preparedness Training Program. The Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) conducted this training program. These certified instructors have the responsibility to train first responders in America's 120 largest cities regarding the unique aspects of WMD incidents.

This pool of certified instructors leverages the Army Reserve contribution to the 120 cities domestic preparedness training program. By March 1998, the Army Reserve WMD DP Branch has provided instructors for 10 of the last 12 city training programs in the following cities: Washington, D.C.; Memphis; Las Vegas; Kansas City; Indianapolis; Dallas; Seattle; Baltimore; Miami; and Atlanta.²³ Ten cities training programs were successfully completed by CBDCOM

before the Army Reserve WMD DP Branch had built its core of certified instructors. Army Reserve participation in these training programs increases as the instructor pool increases. It will maximize when the WMD DP battalions are formed and begin to conduct training.²⁴

LEVERAGING EXISTING MANUEVER SUPPORT CENTER TRAINING RESOURCES AND THE U.S.ARMY RESERVE DIVISION (INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING)

The following recommendations will minimally fix the first responders training program.

The Secretary of Defense should consider such options:

- Coordinate with the DOD to use any excess capacity of the U.S. Army's Chemical Corps facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to train first responders, hazardous material specialists, and incident commanders.
- Establish a second CDP to conduct first responder training at U.S. Army Maneuver
 Support Center (MANSCEN) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
- Expand domestic preparedness training program in the U.S. Army Reserve
 Division (Institutional Training) by restructuring the DIV (IT) to include a WMD DP
 Brigade capable of conducting individual training in domestic preparedness using
 the approved Program of Instruction (POI) developed initially by CBDCOM.
- Continue the current level of interagency training program.

Local and state first responders will benefit from the use of U.S. Army Chemical Corps facility. The DOD's DPTP enhanced its role in military support to civilian authority; it will leverage with the DOJs CDP training program. Currently, the DOJ's CDP is unable to meet the training demand. The local and state waiting list to attend CDP consists of more than 5,000 prospective students. DOD's current program is under-funded; funding should be greatly increased if U.S. Army Chemical School continues to conduct DPTP. This boost will provide training for an average of over 9,000 first responders annually.

Establishing a second CDP to conduct 'first responder' training at Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) is feasible. The current program of instruction taught at the U.S. Army Chemical School could be expanded by USAR Division (Institutional Training) in view of their CS/CSS. core competencies. DOD may use the Div (ITs) to familiarize first responders on Military support to Civil Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLAE). MSCLEA is currently applicable to DOD operations to support drug suppression operations, suppression of WME, and Military Assistance to Civil Disturbance (MACDIS). Currently, the MPS conducts 'Security Force Protection and Law Enforcement' training program at MANSCEN. This course of action will require federal funding and will quickly provide more first responder training.

Interagency training programs, "train the trainer", for first responders are limited to DOJ, FEMA, and HHS at the federal level. This program cannot meet current demands for first responder training. Increase of funding to conduct training over time is vital at operational and programmatic levels.

The Secretary of Defense can enhance the role of DOD in Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA) by establishing a training program for domestic preparedness at Div (ITs), thereby enabling training of more first responders in case of domestic emergency. DOD had previously developed education and training opportunities to account for the high number of volunteer personnel in first responder disciplines. DOD should continue to provide the full program currently taught at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri as well as leveraged USAR Div (ITs) assets. The addition of USAR Div (ITs) to the training package will enhance the nations domestic preparedness.

To better serve the federal, state and local agencies, each Div (IT) should be restructured to include a WMD DP Brigade capable of conducting individual training in domestic preparedness using the approved Program of Instruction (POI) developed initially by CBDCOM. The same POI is used by 120-city first responder training program being conducted under the mandate of Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD).

LEVERAGING USAR TRAINING SUPPPORT DIVISIONS

The planning, resourcing, and facilitation of simulation-based collective training is another Army Reserve core competency. It holds tremendous potential for application to the Domestic Preparedness Training Program. The USAR has simulation centers in the following Training Support Divisions (TSDs): the 75th, 78th, 85th, 87th, and the 91st. Each of the Army Reserve 's five Training Support Divisions (TSDs) includes one brigade dedicated to supporting simulation-based training. The WMD DP program can leverage existing simulation equipment (hardware and software), as well as TSDs experience in exercise planning and management and facilitation of after action reviews.

The battle command staff training include the following: conducting battle-focused training of battalion/brigade level combat support and combat service support staffs, and command elements, using computer assisted simulation. TSDs plan, conduct and evaluate training exercises for Army Reserve and National Guard units. Their other missions include Lanes Training for Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. Lanes Training is a technique used to train primarily company team level and smaller units on a series of selected soldier, leader, and collective tasks using specific terrain. The TSDs also provide training and

mobilization support to Reserve Component units upon their mobilization. The Division's Training Support Brigades also serve to support Military assistance to Civilian Authorities (MSCA) missions in response to natural disasters or emergencies. The TSDs Battle Projection Centers (BPCs) provide a constructive simulation to USAR and ARNG units.

The DOD should leverage existing TSDs BPCs to develop training support packages for WME consequence management exercises. The principal simulation designed to support such training is Spectrum. The existing SPECTRUM simulation software version may be modified in order to better support WME consequence management training. Spectrum was designed by the National Simulation Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to address command and control and coordination training in military operations other than war (MOOTW).

LEVERAGING USAR DIVISION (INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING) RESOURCES

Another way to leverage USAR assets is to restructure the Division (Institutional Training) into a WME domestic preparedness brigade. The Div (ITs) may be reorganized to create seven WME brigades in the Divisions

(IT) out of existing assets. A colonel (IDT, AGR) will command these brigades. These brigades (Fig. 2) will be authorized a total of 93 personnel (82 IDT, 8 AGR, 3 Military Technician).²⁵ Each brigade will consist of a staff (11 personnel), one distance learning detachment (6 personnel), and six




FIGURE 2. WME BRIGADE ORGANIZATION CHART

instructor detachments (11 personnel each).²⁶ Each instructor detachment will be comprised of 11 Troop Program Unit (TPU) soldiers and will be led by a lieutenant colonel.²⁷ Active Guard Reserve (AGR) personnel will man key slots in order to facilitate full-time coordination with customers from the civilian first responder community as well as to facilitate on-going planning and preparation of training events for these customers. The eight positions (coded as AGR) include brigade S3 (LTC); personnel services NCO (SFC); supply sergeant (SFC); three instructor leaders (MAJ, CPT, MSG); and the commander (MAJ) and one web master (SSG) for the distance learning detachment.²⁸ The three AGR instructor leaders will train and validate the TPU instructors on each of the instructor detachments within each brigade and serve as back-

up instructors as required.²⁹ The seven Div (ITs), each with a WME DP brigade, will total 595 TPU soldiers, 56 AGR soldiers and 21 Military Technicians.³⁰

These USAR WME DP brigades will provide individual training to federal, state, local, and military agencies using the CBDCOM approved POI currently being taught in the NLD 120 city training program. The WME DP brigades may conduct individual training courses: WME Awareness; WME Operations; Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT); WME Incident Command; and various medical courses. Each WME DP brigade will provide training to civilian first responder clients on an area basis consistent with the geographical responsibilities of its parent Div (IT). In addition, individual training should include the following training delivery methods: school house; mobile training teams; and distance learning (video-teleconference, CD ROM disks, or Internet based).

LEVERAGING USAR REGIONAL SUPPORT COMMANDS

The U.S. Army Reserve Regional Support Commands (RSCs) were organized to empower the USAR to furnish efficient military sustenance to civilian authorities and federal agencies in support of domestic missions such as federal disaster relief. The ten RSCs were geographically distributed across the continental U.S. in accordance with the ten Standard Federal Regions (SFRs) to decrease response time and ensure assets are available when needed. Federal Agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) used the SFRs. A typical RSC has between 228 to 365 Troop Program Unit (TPUs) soldiers with 137 to 224 full time employees. The size depends on the geographical area and the supported number of soldiers and units in that region. The USAR has an enhanced capability to support domestic actions.

In addition, the RSC provide command and control to selected USAR troop program units and provide full service support to all USAR units within their geographic boundaries during peacetime. Peacetime support by the RSCs to all Army Reserve units in their regions included resource and logistics management, personnel functions, real property management, and regional planning related to Military Support to Civilian Authorities (MSCA) and FEMA projects. The RSCs also provide command and control for units that are unassigned to a functional "go to war" command, thereby allowing functional commands to discard administration and housekeeping functions not needed after mobilization. During mobilization, the RSCs assist units and individuals in mobilization, deployment, and redeployment. The three RSCs exceeding more than 20,000 troops were provided additional support from the Regional Support

Group (RSG). The three RSGs provide supply, administrative, logistics, and customary support services.

The RSC commanders have the authority to take immediate action in response to requests of civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage in accordance with DOD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. A commander must decide if an "immediate response" is appropriate, based on the commander's estimate of the situation. Such estimates must consider legality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness. Immediate response will not be delayed or denied if the requester or LFA is unable or unwilling to make commitment to reimburse the DOD. In October1994 during the heavy rain in Texas which resulted in considerable flooding, the Texas governor declared 30 counties to be disaster areas.³² One of the worst affected counties was Montgomery. The county sheriff sought evacuation assistance from a reserve unit stationed in Conroe, Texas. The reserve unit DCSOPS, through his commander, authorized the unit to support Montgomery Country under DOD Directive 3025.1, Immediate Response. The unit's mission was to drive vehicles in support of flood victim evacuation from the Montgomery/Conroe county area. The unit utilized seven soldiers and seven vehicles; drove more than 1,500 miles.³³ The unit evacuated more than 550 civilians to higher grounds, shelters, or to ambulances as needed. Children, the elderly, and handicapped accounted for many of the evacuated civilians.³⁴

The RSCs possesses viable, proven command and control structures to facilitate participation in MSCA missions. Regional Support Commands (RSCs) are capable of quickly activating units and soldiers upon receiving a DOD approved FEMA domestic response (consequence management) request. This process is facilitated by direct communications links from the RSCs to the FEMA hotline. RSC emergency operations centers (EOCs) are capable of rapid and smooth integration into Response Tasks Forces (RTFs) East/West standing organizations established by either Continental U.S. Army (CONUSA).

The USAR Wide Area Network (WAN) is currently set up in three-tier configuration with core services connected between the USARC, RSCs, Office of the Chief Army Reserve (OCAR), and Army Reserve-Personnel Support Command (AR-PERSCOM) via MCI® Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) service. The RSCs act as a distribution point via regionally based ATM frame service to the reserve centers in their area of operations. The Army Reserve Net (ARNet) is now configured with a flatter MCI ATM core servicing USARC RSC, Direct Reporting Command (DRC) Headquarters, OCAR, and AR-PERSCOM. MCI frame services have facilitated an "inter-network" connection directly between ATM and frame at

the RSC distribution points.³⁸ This "inter-network" connection permits the use of single, large NxT1 circuits to support physical connectivity both at the core (ATM0 and access (Frame) layers of the network.³⁹ Everything works under one umbrella, with a core data server at the USARC and connections to the RSC and DRC commands.⁴⁰

The RSC can form domestic response teams known as the Consequence Action Teams (CATs). These teams would provide a federal response capability that includes nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance and decontamination assets as well as medical assets. These Army Reserve response teams would be organized like the National Guard rapid assessment teams yet these teams would have the following advantage over the National Guard rapid response teams: greater medical capacity and the ability to deploy to any state without taking away from state assets. In contrast to the National Guard rapid response teams, the Army Reserve CAT teams would have the following disadvantage: they would not be able to respond to a non-federalized incident site (i.e., federal property such as an active duty military installation) until the President declared the incident a federal disaster.

LEVERAGING USAR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS LIAISON OFFICERS

The Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers offer another important resource to DOD for providing military response for consequence management. In pre-incident phase, the EPLO would provide liaison with local, state, and federal agencies. They would identify and help coordinate combined and consequence management exercises between federal and state agencies and other uniform services. Among the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) responsibilities were training EPLOs in WME consequence response, training civilians as first responders and health providers, and resourcing EPLOs programs for WME mission-out years. The reorganization of Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) into RSCs resulted in USARC's incorporation of the EPLO position into the RSCs. Prior to restructuring of ARCOMs to RSCs, there were no dedicated personnel below the USARC. There are now over 270 EPLOs who coordinate plans and emergency response within the DOD. 42

CONCLUSIONS

In the event of an incident, those closest to the problem are going to be the first to respond. But the in the event of a catastrophic incident, those state and local capabilities may be quickly overwhelmed. If a civilian authority requests federal support, the lead federal agency, FBI or FEMA, is likely to request support from other federal agencies, including DOD. While DOD has taken steps to improve its capability to provide military support to civilian authority in

the area of consequence management, it can leverage its existing USAR assets and resources in a more effective way. More can be done to support the consequence management program so DOD's consequence management program could fully tap the capabilities and resources available in the USAR. USAR resources and capabilities can improve the current DOD consequence management program through training, command, control, and coordination. Future consequence management programs must be responsive to the needs identified by local, state, and federal agencies. Until USAR resources and capabilities are addressed in the future consequence management program, the U.S. will continue to be more vulnerable to asymmetric attack for the foreseeable future. USAR configuration will help economize the response but not negate it completely.

The challenges for the future preparedness and counterterrorism program are extremely complex. Effective collaboration among level of the Federal and state governments are necessary for the United States to fully prepare for the spectrum of threats it may face. Although there is almost a universal support to expand emergency preparedness and counterterrorism program in the wake of Sep 11, 2001, such support could increase over time. Domestic preparedness is a public necessity and it should not be viewed as response to specific incident. Thus as first responders training capacity expand, there needs to be consideration as to how such increase capacity will be sustained if we manage to deter or prevent future attacks.

Finally, the United States Army Reserve offers numerous real opportunities to expand their roles in consequence management in support of homeland security. The U.S. Army Reserve role in domestic preparedness is not a new mission. Leveraging the U.S. Army Reserve capabilities will ensure availability, survivability, and adequacy of critical national assets.

WORD COUNT = 6,499

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<sup>13</sup>ibid., 5.
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¹⁴ibid., 5.

¹⁵ibid., 5.

¹⁶ibid., 6

¹⁷ibid., 6.

¹⁸ibid., 6.

¹⁹ ibid., 6.
²⁰ ibid., 6.
²¹ ibid., 6.
²² ibid., 8.
²³ ibid., 9
²⁴ ibid., 9.
²⁵ ibid.,12.
²⁶ ibid., 13.
²⁷ ibid., 13.
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³⁰ ibid.,13.
³¹ Kathryn Roe Coker and Edward P. Shanahan, <u>U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History</u> , 1 January to 31 December 1995 (Atlanta, Georgia: U.S. Army Reserve Command, 1997) 6.
³² ibid., 227.
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³⁴ ibid, 227.
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³⁶ .ibid.
³⁷ ibid.
³⁷ ibid. ³⁸ ibid.

⁴¹Kathyrn Roe Coker., U.S. Army Reserve Command Annual Command History, 1 January to 31 december 1997 (Atlanta, GA: U.S. Army Reserve Command, 1999), 72.

⁴²ibid., 72.

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